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INTRODUCTION
Incarceration as a means of rehabilitation is one of the most
important American contributions to criminal punishment theory.
In America’s early years, authorities imprisoned only political
prisoners, while common criminals were tortured, killed, or
1
pardoned. Members of the Quaker faith promoted incarceration as
punishment based on the idea that everyone had the potential to be
2
redeemed; therefore, imprisonment saved the lives of criminals and
3
allowed them the time and repose to reform themselves. While
rehabilitation has never completely disappeared as a criminal justice
goal, by the mid-1970s, many people questioned the effectiveness of
4
rehabilitation programs. In the 1990s, incarceration as retribution
and incapacitation achieved dominance, as expressed by strict
5
mandatory sentences and the “Get Tough on Crime” rhetoric.
America’s “War on Drugs” exemplifies problems associated with a
policy of incarceration without rehabilitation. Fueled by the crackcocaine epidemic of the 1980s, this “War” brought strict mandatory
minimum sentences for drug offenses and flooded the jails and
6
prisons with drug offenders. This response, however, did little to
1. See THOMAS L. DUMM, DEMOCRACY AND PUNISHMENT: DISCIPLINARY ORIGINS OF
UNITED STATES 65-86 (U. Wis. Press 1987) (providing historical background to
the growth of the penitentiary in American criminology).
2. Id. at 65; see also OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 478 (2d ed. 1989) (revealing
that the etymological origin of the word “penitentiary” means, in its original design,
the reformation of convicts through personal repentance).
3. See DUMM, supra note 1, at 77 (explaining the Quaker belief that through
personal reflection, everyone could find “God’s Inner Light” and be saved).
4. See Richard S. Gebelein, The Rebirth of Rehabilitation: Promise and Perils of Drug
Courts, 6 SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS: ISSUES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, May 2000, at 1,
2 (giving historical context for the rise and fall of rehabilitation as a popular
punishment goal).
5. Id. at 2; see also Leslie Acoca & Myrna S. Raeder, Severing Family Ties: The
Plight of Nonviolent Female Offenders and their Children, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 133
(1999) (examining the dramatic increase in the incarceration rates of women and
girls since the 1970s).
6. DRUG COURT STANDARDS COMMITTEE, NAT’L ASS’N OF DRUG COURT PROF’LS,
DEFINING DRUG COURTS: THE KEY COMPONENTS 5 (1997) [hereinafter DRUG COURT
STANDARDS COMMITTEE]; see also Ethan G. Kalett, Note, Twelve Steps, You’re Out (of
Prison): An Evaluation of “Anonymous Programs” as Alternative Sentences, 48 HASTINGS
L.J. 129, 134 (1996) (characterizing the harsh sentences and political attitudes
toward drug offenders as a manifestation of national frustration over addiction
THE
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7

“curtail the illicit use of drugs and alcohol,” but instead resulted in
8
prisons crowded with drug offenders. Many see this as a policy
failure, and have sought alternative approaches for dealing with drug
offenders in the criminal justice system.
Currently, many incarcerated drug offenders receive treatment for
9
substance abuse in the correctional setting. However, the more
promising recent developments for rehabilitation now occur outside
prisons in programs and courts that send certain criminal offenders
10
to treatment in the community, rather than prison. Among the
most exciting of these developments are the drug treatment courts,
often referred to simply as drug courts.
Although neither drug courts nor criminal and addiction
rehabilitation generally advocate a spiritual or religious reformation
of the drug abuser, one of the most common addiction treatment
support programs used in the drug courts does have religious
11
components. Narcotics Anonymous and its precursor, Alcoholics
Anonymous, are often a part of the treatment protocol assigned to
12
Many commentators have noted the
drug court participants.
religious aspects of the 12-Step model on which these programs are
13
based, such as the necessity of belief in a “Higher Power.” While the
problems).
7. DRUG COURT STANDARDS COMMITTEE, supra note 6, at 5.
8. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DRUG AND CRIME FACTS (2002) (reporting
that the number of drug arrests among adults almost tripled during the 1980s—from
471,200 in 1980 to 1,247,800 in 1989), at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/
dcf.pdf (on file with the American University Law Review); Douglas Marlowe, Effective
Strategies for Intervening with Drug Abusing Offenders, 47 VILL. L. REV. 989, 997-98 (2002)
(comparing a fifty-five percent recidivism rate for all criminal offenders with an
eighty-five percent recidivism rate for drug offenders).
9. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND TREATMENT, STATE
AND FEDERAL PRISONERS, 1997 10 (1999) (reporting that one in four prisoners in the
United States participated in some kind of drug abuse program while incarcerated).
But see Marlowe, supra note 8, at 998-1001 (concluding, based on several studies, that
in-prison substance abuse treatment programs have little effect on long-term drug
use or criminal recidivism).
10. See WILLIAM WHITE, SLAYING THE DRAGON: THE HISTORY OF ADDICTION
TREATMENT AND RECOVERY IN AMERICA 305 (1998) (providing alternatives to
incarceration such as pre-arrest diversion to detoxification, post-arrest diversion to
detoxification or counseling, and treatment as a condition of pre-trial release); see,
e.g., THE NATIONAL GAINS CENTER FOR PEOPLE WITH CO-OCCURRING DISORDERS IN THE
JUSTICE SYSTEM, NEW OPTIONS FOR OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL HEALTH AND SUBSTANCE
USE DISORDERS (2001) (outlining a program that promotes diversion from jail to
treatment for persons with co-occurring mental illness and substance abuse).
11. See Derek P. Apanovitch, Note, Religion and Rehabilitation: The Requisition of
God by the State, 47 DUKE L.J. 785, 790-91 (1998) (exploring the religious aspects of
Alcoholics Anonymous, such as prayer and emphasis on theistic principles).
12. See JAMES L. NOLAN, JR., DRUG COURTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE vii (2002)
(giving an overview of elements of standard treatment protocols in drug courts).
13. See, e.g., Apanovitch, supra note 11, at 797 (finding that the religious
components of 12-Step programs should prompt Establishment Clause scrutiny);
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program model is widely recognized and widely regarded as
successful, a large movement of individuals exists that dislikes the 12Step model for a number of reasons, including the religious
14
content.
Several commentators have persuasively argued that state
mandated participation in 12-Step programs violates the
Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution when included as a
condition of probation or when a prisoner is required to attend in
15
order to receive favorable treatment. While the drug court context
fundamentally alters the analysis required by Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, this Comment ultimately argues that these distinctions
do not change the results of the inquiry. Specifically, mandated 12Step participation as a component of a drug court treatment program
violates an individual’s First Amendment right to be free from
government endorsed religion.
To facilitate the analysis, Part II presents background information
on drug courts. Part III follows with an overview of 12-Step programs
and explains why some courts have concluded that they are religious.
Part IV delves into the Establishment Clause analysis, explaining the
tests the Supreme Court developed to analyze challenged
government action, how they have been applied in prison and
probation contexts, and how they should be applied to drug court
action. Part V explores the popularity of 12-Step programs and some
alternatives.
Additionally, this part presents a policy analysis,
reasoning that it is inappropriate to try to rehabilitate addicts
through programs that alienate them. Finally, this Comment
concludes by recommending that drug courts give participants the
choice of a secular support group rather than just mandating 12-Step
Rachel F. Calabro, Note, Correction Through Coercion: Do State Mandated Alcohol and
Drug Treatment Programs in Prisons Violate the Establishment Clause?, 47 DEPAUL L. REV.
565, 595, 613 (1998) (concluding that, based on its history, continuing traditions and
incorporation of prayer, Alcoholics Anonymous is properly considered a religion).
14. See WHITE, supra note 10, at 156-57 (listing some frequent criticisms of the 12Step approach, including the complaints that the model only treats symptoms and
not the underlying cause of addiction; that the programs tend to disempower
participants; that the program ignores environmental factors like socio-economic
status; and that the religious language and concepts keep many addicts from wanting
to become affiliated with a 12-Step program).
15. See, e.g., Apanovitch, supra note 11, at 851 (concluding that the principle of
separation of church and state dictates a finding that government promotion of 12Step programs is unconstitutional); Calabro, supra note 13, at 613 (arguing that
compulsory 12-Step participation in prison is unconstitutionally coercive); Michael
G. Honeymar, Jr., Alcoholics Anonymous as a Condition of Drunk Driving Probation: When
Does it Amount to Establishment of Religion?, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 437, 471 (1997)
(contending that compulsory attendance to Alcoholics Anonymous as a condition of
probation for a drunk driving offense is a violation of the Establishment Clause).
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programs, and suggesting that professional organizations concerned
with drug courts promote this change.
I.

WHAT IS A DRUG COURT?

Drug courts are specialty courts that apply legal pressure to prod
drug offenders and other substance-involved defendants to complete
substance abuse treatment instead of receiving a traditional
punishment. This is done in the hope that remedying someone’s
addiction will remove that participant’s incentive to commit future
16
crimes.
17
What has turned into an international movement began in 1989
18
with an experimental judicial program in Dade County, Florida.
The innovations of the first drug court emphasized “drug treatment,
19
responsibility, and accountability,” and created a setting in which
the judge, prosecutor, and defense attorney worked together as a
20
team to promote successful treatment of the offender.
The
program developed as a practical response to the extreme pressure
the courts and correctional system experienced as a result of the
21
explosion of drug cases that accompanied the War on Drugs. While
the reason behind the innovation was to serve court efficiency, and
16. See generally DRUG COURT STANDARDS COMMITTEE, supra note 6, at 7
(explaining that the mission of drug courts is to stop criminal activity by stopping
drug abuse).
17. See infra note 25 and accompanying text (discussing the global expansion of
the drug court system).
18. See John S. Goldkamp, The Origin of the Treatment Drug Court in Miami, in THE
EARLY DRUG COURTS: CASE STUDIES IN JUDICIAL INNOVATION 19, 19 (W. Clinton Terry,
III ed., 1999) (discussing the creation of Miami’s drug court, which undertook the
bold step of fully integrating treatment into the court setting, contrary to
contemporary drug policy).
19. Id. at 22.
20. Id. The public defender involved in the program was initially hesitant to
promote the drug court model because of concerns that the length of the program
was longer than the sentences many defendants would receive otherwise. Id. at 2223. Further, the public defender had concerns that the due process rights of clients
might not be protected when judges and prosecutors teamed up with defense
attorneys, who would otherwise function solely for their client. Id.; see also Richard
Boldt, The Adversary System and Attorney Role in the Drug Treatment Court Movement, in
DRUG COURTS IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE 121, 122 (James L. Nolan, Jr. ed., 2002)
(arguing that the drug court’s departure from the traditional adversarial model is
cause for concern because the defense attorney is no longer dedicated to the client’s
legal needs).
21. See Goldkamp, supra note 18, at 21-22 (highlighting the crisis, and the
desperation of criminal justice leaders to make an impact on the situation). Other
courts have been quick to adopt, and adapt, the Miami model. See The Honorable
Peggy Fulton Hora et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Drug Treatment Court
Movement: Revolutionizing the Criminal Justice System’s Response to Drug Abuse and Crime
in America, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 439, 456 (1999) (illustrating how the drug court
model spread primarily through a grassroots movement of judicial innovation, rather
than through top-down, legislative action).
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not to improve addicts’ lives, the court chose to address the problem
22
through rehabilitation of drug-addicted offenders.
This mixture of criminal and addiction rehabilitation concepts has
proved to be successful and enormously popular. Today there are
1,160 drug courts in operation, with 517 more in the planning
23
stages. There is at least one local drug court in all fifty states, plus
the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and Guam, and one federal
24
district; additionally, the drug court model is being replicated
25
abroad. By incorporating advances in addiction research into their
program design, drug courts ensure that the means used for
26
promoting recovery will be tested and proven. The programs are
still developing, but many studies point to lower recidivism and
increased well-being for drug court graduates, while also benefiting
27
participants that did not graduate.
22. See John Terrence A. Rosenthal, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Drug Treatment
Courts: Integrating Law and Science, in DRUG COURTS IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE 157,
157 (James L. Nolan, Jr. ed., 2002) (explaining that the rehabilitative theory of
punishment does not necessarily underlie drug court programs; rather the programs
are aimed at easing caseloads by reducing recidivism, which is accomplished through
rehabilitation). A number of scholars have, however, noted a connection between
the creation of drug courts and the therapeutic jurisprudence theory. See, e.g., Hora,
supra note 21, at 442 (noting that the legal theory of therapeutic jurisprudence,
which examines the impact of the legal system on individuals, can provide a guiding
legal theory for the drug courts); Bruce J. Winick & David B. Wexler, Drug Treatment
Court: Therapeutic Jurisprudence Applied, 18 TOURO L. REV. 479, 480 (2002) (describing
drug courts and other “problem-solving courts” as applications of the theory of
therapeutic jurisprudence); Jeffrey S. Tauber, Therapeutic Jurisprudence Holds Potential
for Drug Offenders, ALCOHOLISM & DRUG ABUSE WKLY., Dec. 3, 2001, at 5 (recognizing
the opportunity to merge the academic discipline of therapeutic jurisprudence with
the pragmatic foundation of drug courts). When analyzed from this framework, the
focus shifts from the impact on the particular court system to the rehabilitative
impact on the defendant involved, as well as how the community at large is affected.
See generally Hora, supra note 21 (suggesting that therapeutic jurisprudence and drug
courts can enrich each other as disciplines).
23. JUSTICE PROGRAMS OFFICE, AM. UNIV., SUMMARY OF DRUG COURT ACTIVITY BY
STATE AND COUNTY (May 2004), available at http://spa.american.edu/justice/
publications/drgchart2k.pdf.
24. Id.
25. James L. Nolan, Jr., Separated by an Uncommon Law: Drug Courts in Great Britain
and America, in DRUG COURTS IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE 89 (James L. Nolan, Jr. ed.,
2002) (stating that the American drug court model has been replicated in Australia,
Canada, England, Ireland and Scotland).
26. See Goldkamp, supra note 18, at 27-32 (describing some of the innovations
influenced by addiction research, such as the flexibility to allow some failed drug
tests, based on the understanding in the treatment community that a single misstep
does not indicate a total failure); see also Rosenthal, supra note 22, at 161 (explaining
that all drug courts shape their programs based on advances in the understanding of
addiction in order to maximize the chances of achieving sustained sobriety for the
offender).
27. See Gebelein, supra note 4, at 5 (stating that reduced criminal recidivism is
observed even in offenders who participated in but did not graduate from drug
court); NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF DRUG COURT PROFESSIONALS, DRUG COURT
RESEARCH SHOWS, at http://www.nadcp.org/whatis/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2004) (on
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Drug courts depart dramatically from typical courts by focusing on
stopping the substance abuse presumed to be the root cause of the
defendant’s criminal activity, rather than on the charged criminal
28
activity. This method abandons the traditional adversarial approach
of prosecution and defense, and replaces it with the two sides
working together as a team, along with the judge and treatment
29
provider. Drug courts vary widely in their particular approach, but
generally they require a defendant to plead guilty to the criminal
30
In
charges, or the court defers charges pending treatment.
exchange for successfully completing treatment, drug courts
31
generally dismiss the original charge, or set aside the sentence.
A drug court participant must appear before the court fairly often,
32
and undergo frequent drug testing to ensure treatment compliance.
The in-court interactions with the judge tend to be informal, and
ongoing successes or setbacks in recovery receive, respectively,
33
immediate rewards or sanctions. Each participant is assigned to a
file with the American University Law Review) (claiming that drug court clients
substantially reduce their drug use and criminal behavior, and that criminal behavior
remains low after graduation). But see U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DRUG COURTS:
OVERVIEW OF GROWTH, CHARACTERISTICS, AND RESULTS 14 (1997) (suggesting that
current studies have not yet definitively answered the question of whether drug
courts work).
28. See DRUG COURT STANDARDS COMMITTEE, supra note 6, at 5-7 (describing the
revolving door of arrest, prosecution, conviction, imprisonment, and release through
which the traditional criminal justice system sends drug offenders); Boldt, supra note
20, at 119 (explaining the intertwined premises supporting drug court programs:
that the disease of substance abuse often leads directly to criminal acts, that drugaddicted offenders do not receive adequate treatment in the traditional correctional
setting, and that substance use and criminal behavior will continue after the period
of incarceration is complete).
29. DRUG COURT STANDARDS COMMITTEE, supra note 6, at 6; see also JAMES L.
NOLAN, JR., REINVENTING JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN DRUG COURT MOVEMENT 40 (2001)
(explaining that for many routine drug court appearances, the lawyers do not even
attend, and if they do, they may not even be recognizable as defense attorneys or
prosecutors).
30. See NOLAN, JR., supra note 29, at 41 (providing an explanation of the
mechanisms to enter drug court pretrial/preplea, pretrial/postplea, postconviction,
or some combination of these events); see also Juanita Bing-Newton, What Does the
Future Hold for Drug Courts?: Eleventh Annual Symposium on Contemporary Urban
Challenges, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1858, 1881 (2002) (expressing concern over the
Fourth Amendment implications of treating a defendant as guilty without a trial or
plea).
31. DRUG COURT STANDARDS COMMITTEE, supra note 6, at 7.
32. See Gebelein, supra note 4, at 3 (noting that courts require defendants to
appear in court as often as several times a week, and that drug tests are frequent and
random).
33. See NOLAN, JR., supra note 29, at 40 (listing as incentives offered judicial
praise, applause, or prizes such as t-shirts, key-chains, mugs, donuts, or candy, along
with graduation ceremonies that include cake, speeches, visits from local dignitaries
and media coverage). In addition to general expressions of judicial disapproval,
sanctions include community service, short jail stays, required increase in 12-Step
participation or time in the jury box during other drug court sessions. Id.; see
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specific treatment regimen that may include inpatient or outpatient
treatment, individual and group counseling, and development of
34
various coping strategies. One of the common features of treatment
35
protocols is assignment to a 12-Step program. Likewise, a common
sanction for a failed drug test or other treatment setback is a mandate
36
to attend supplementary 12-Step sessions.
Most drug court entry procedures begin with a two-step screening
process soon after arrest to determine who will be offered the
37
opportunity to enter the drug court. The first step is a judicial
screening to determine if the arrestee meets the eligibility
38
requirements set by each individual court.
Eligibility criteria
39
include factors such as criminal history, extent of substance abuse
40
41
dependency, and current criminal charge. The second part of the
generally Rosenthal, supra note 22, at 161 (explaining that the traditional criminal
justice system often serves as an unwitting enabler because the slow and deliberative
procedures delay consequences for actions, and traditional defense counsel can
reinforce an addict’s denial of a drug problem).
34. See NOLAN, JR., supra note 29, at 41 (providing details of the range of
treatment options available to different courts, such as private treatment facilities,
county health departments, outpatient treatment, and residential facilities).
35. See id. at vii (noting that treatment protocols generally include the support of
regular 12-Step participation, group counseling sessions, craving-relieving
acupuncture, and regular reports to the drug court judge).
36. See id. (confirming that penalties for drug use during rehabilitation include
Narcotics Anonymous meetings, community service, and jail time).
37. See W. Clinton Terry, III, Judicial Change and Dedicated Treatment Courts: Case
Studies in Innovation, in THE EARLY DRUG COURTS: CASE STUDIES IN JUDICIAL
INNOVATION 1, 5 (W. Clinton Terry, III ed., 1999) (explaining that the intervention is
designed to be swift in order to capitalize on the ordeal of the arrest and to engage
the individuals while their motivation to reform is high).
38. See ROGER H. PETERS & ELIZABETH PEYTON, AM. UNIV., GUIDELINES FOR DRUG
COURTS ON SCREENING AND ASSESSMENT 3 (1998) (summarizing a typical drug court
screening process, in which the judge and prosecutor make the final decision on
eligibility), available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/bja/171143.pdf.
39. See CAROLINE S. COOPER, 2000 DRUG COURT SURVEY REPORT, EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY 21 (2001) (explaining that because federal funding is only available to
programs that exclude persons convicted of violent offenses, a non-violent criminal
history is required to enter most drug courts), available at http://spa.american.edu/
justice/publications/execsum.pdf. Federal funding became available to drug courts
with the passage of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1994, which
authorized the Attorney General to make grants to states, localities, and tribal
authorities to establish drug courts for non-violent drug offenders. 42 U.S.C. § 3769
(1994).
40. See COOPER, supra note 39, at 22 (reporting that all programs target drug
users with moderate illegal substance use, and that 90 percent of programs target
individuals with severe substance abuse problems). Most programs also accept
individuals with alcohol addictions, although usually only when the alcohol problem
is also associated with a drug addiction. Id.
41. See id. at 21 (stating that all drug court programs indicated that they accept
participants charged with drug possession, while a smaller percentage allow
individuals into the program charged with small drug sales, property offenses,
DUI/DWI, financial or prescription forgeries, and prostitution). Certain factors
such as gang membership, out of county residence, current probation or parole
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screening process involves a clinical screening to determine if the
arrestee actually has an addiction or substance abuse problem that is
42
likely to benefit from available treatment. The clinical screening
also determines whether there are other clinical features, such as a
psychiatric disorder that could compromise the potential
43
participant’s success in overcoming the addiction.
If the screening reveals arrestees that are eligible, and they choose
to enter the drug court, then each must continue to meet the court
requirements for a specified amount of time before exiting
44
successfully. Most drug courts require participants to remain “clean
and sober” for twelve consecutive months in addition to other
obligations, such as earning a high school diploma or GED and
45
obtaining a job before they can “graduate.”
Courts punish minor infractions or an occasional failed drug test
with intermediate sanctions, such as a brief detention in jail, or
46
greater treatment requirements.
However, if the infractions are
more constant, the drug court team may conclude that the individual
47
will not succeed in the program at all. If the team reaches this
conclusion, the individual will fail out of drug court, and the case will
be remanded back to the traditional criminal court for trial or
48
sentencing.
It is important to note that drug courts are local creations,
49
designed by the judges sitting in individual jurisdictions. As such,
status, mental illness, or lack of transportation can disqualify a potential participant
in various drug courts. Id. at 22.
42. PETERS & PEYTON, supra note 38, at 3.
43. COOPER, supra note 39, at 8. According to a 1997 survey, over one-half of the
existing drug courts maintained services for persons with co-occurring psychiatric
and substance use disorders, but judges did not believe they were adequately
equipped with an understanding of how a mental illness could affect an individual’s
experience in drug court. DRUG COURT CLEARINGHOUSE AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
PROJECT, ISSUES MEMORANDUM: DRUG COURT CLIENTS WHO ARE DUALLY DIAGNOSED
(June 1997), available at http://spa.american.edu/justice/publications/dualdiag.
htm.
44. See generally Terry, III, supra note 37, at 7-8 (describing the central role of the
judge as a problem-solver in developing the specific requirements designed to
address the addictions and criminal behaviors of each participant).
45. James J. Hennessy, Introduction: Drug Courts in Operation, in DRUG COURTS IN
OPERATION: CURRENT RESEARCH 1, 6 (James J. Hennessy & Nathaniel J. Pallone eds.,
2001).
46. Id.
47. See Elaine M. Wolf, Systemic Constraints on the Implementation of a Northeastern
Drug Court, in DRUG COURTS IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE 27, 40-44 (James L. Nolan, Jr.
ed., 2002) (chronicling the treatment non-compliance of a drug court participant,
including daily use of drugs, that led the team to consider failing him even after
nineteen months in the program).
48. Hennessy, supra note 45, at 7.
49. See NOLAN, JR., supra note 29, at 42 (quoting drug court judge Henry Weber
describing the spread of drug courts as “a grassroots kind of movement”). He
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there are numerous variations intended to meet local needs.
Therefore, any constitutional analysis of a specific drug court
program that is based on individual program features may not be
applicable to all drug courts. However, major themes and similarities
51
pervade the drug court context and allow for general discussion.
II. WHAT 12-STEP PARTICIPATION ENTAILS

Generally, 12-Step programs play small, but important, roles in the
52
treatment plans designed for drug court participants. The 12-Step
program does not function as the primary treatment component, but
53
rather supplements other treatment elements. The 12-Step model,
54
which was originally developed by Alcoholics Anonymous, has been
replicated in numerous programs that address a variety of addictions,
continues, “It’s not something where bureaucrats in Washington tell you what to do.
Each community has developed its own program for its own particular needs and
they all deal with it on a local level.” Id.; see also Terry, III, supra note 37, at 6
(characterizing local variations in drug programs as critical to the success of drug
courts because of the weight of local tradition in the American criminal justice
system).
50. See generally COOPER, supra note 39 (noting the distinguishing features of each
court, such as eligibility criteria, treatment components, and sanctions).
51. Despite the local variations, there are some common factors. See DRUG
COURT STANDARDS COMMITTEE, supra note 6, at 9-37 (listing key components of drug
courts as follows: (1) integrated treatment with justice system case processing;
(2) non-adversarial approach; (3) eligible participants identified early; (4) access to a
continuum of treatment and rehabilitation services; (5) abstinence monitored by
frequent drug testing; (6) coordinated strategy governing responses to compliance;
(7) ongoing judicial interaction with participants; (8) evaluation measuring program
goals; (9) continuing interdisciplinary education promoting effectiveness of
program; and (10) partnerships forged with the community to enhance the
effectiveness of the program).
52. See, e.g., DUCKWATER SHOSHONE TRIBAL DRUG COURT, TREATMENT PROGRAM
REQUIREMENTS, available at http://spa.american.edu/justice/publications/duck
waterjuvrequirements.pdf (last visited Jan. 5, 2004) (listing drug court’s specific
requirements for the initial phase to include twice-weekly meetings with a social
worker, twice-monthly individual counseling sessions, four-times-weekly drug testing,
twice-weekly 12-Step attendance, twice-monthly appearances at drug court,
attendance to two “sober activities” planned by the social worker, general education
advancements, and education and counseling specific to addiction issues such as
fetal alcohol syndrome and HIV); see also COOPER, supra note 39, at 8 (explaining that
the range of services provided by most drug courts has expanded to include services
ancillary to formal addiction treatment, such as support for family problems,
employment, and self-esteem).
53. See WHITE, supra note 10, at 175-76 (explaining that formal treatment is
focused on initiating sobriety, while mutual aid programs like Alcoholics Anonymous
work to help individuals sustain that sobriety). Addiction treatment involves
diagnosis and interventions by doctors or therapists that target the cravings and
compulsions of addictive behavior. Alcoholics Anonymous, on the other hand,
claims no expertise in addiction science, but looks only to help alcoholics get
through each day without drinking. Id.
54. See id. at 127-32 (establishing that, while mutual aid groups existed long
before the founding of Alcoholics Anonymous in 1935, it was Alcoholics Anonymous
founder Bill Wilson who compiled the influential 12-Step program).
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55

such as drug use, gambling, and overeating. These offshoots tend to
remain loyal to the basic structure of Alcoholics Anonymous, despite
56
the different vices they address. While the Alcoholics Anonymous
organization is adamant that the 12-Step model that is the foundation
57
for each of these programs is not religious, many courts and
commentators find differently, based on the history of the
58
organization and the current meeting practices.
A. Spiritual Beginnings of Alcoholics Anonymous
The founders of Alcoholics Anonymous were “enthusiastic
members” of the Oxford Group Movement, a non-denominational,
59
evangelical Christian movement.
This movement taught
participants to publicly confess their sins, surrender to guidance from
60
God, and carry their religious message to others.
Alcoholics
61
Anonymous tells its own history in what is termed “The Big Book,”
including the colorful story of founder Bill Wilson’s alcoholism and
62
the epiphany that led to his recovery.
55. See KLAUS MÄKELÄ ET AL., ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS AS A MUTUAL–HELP
MOVEMENT: A STUDY IN EIGHT SOCIETIES 217 (1996) (providing background
information on the offshoots of Alcoholics Anonymous, including Narcotics
Anonymous, which is particularly important to the drug court context). The
Narcotics Anonymous program, formed in 1953, was originally a branch of
Alcoholics Anonymous for members with both alcohol and drug problems, but it
soon gained organizational independence. Id.
56. Id. See generally CHARLES BUFE, ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS: CULT OR CURE? 64-66
(2d ed. 1998)(stating that the philosophy of the 12–Step program requires addicts to
admit their addictions and their personal powerlessness to overcome them).
Through the 12-Steps and life-long fellowship with other program members,
participants are supposed to gain strength to achieve abstinence. Id.
57. See infra notes 63-65 and accompanying text (asserting that Alcoholics
Anonymous does not purport to align itself with religious doctrine).
58. See infra notes 75, 82-87 and accompanying text (noting that, although
Alcoholics Anonymous insists it is not religious, many courts have determined that its
references to God violate the Establishment Clause).
59. BUFE, supra note 56, at 14-15.
60. Id. at 18.
61. BILL W., ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS: THE STORY OF HOW MANY THOUSANDS OF
MEN AND WOMEN HAVE RECOVERED FROM ALCOHOLISM (3d ed. 1976) [hereinafter BIG
BOOK].
62. See id. at 9-13 (giving Wilson’s account of the inspiration for the 12-Step
movement). He claims that the movement began when he was visited by an old
friend and former drinking companion who explained his restraint from drinking by
proclaiming, “I’ve got religion.” Id. at 9. Amazed at the recovery of his friend,
Wilson experienced an epiphany regarding the possibility of recovery through
spirituality. Id. at 11. The triumphant crescendo to Wilson’s story reads as follows:
There I humbly offered myself to God, as I then understood Him, to do with
me as He would. I placed myself unreservedly under His care and direction.
I admitted for the first time that of myself I was nothing; that without Him I
was lost. I ruthlessly faced my sins and became willing to have my new-found
Friend take them away, root and branch. I have not had a drink since.
Id. at 13.

GALLAS.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC

1074

10/3/2004 5:57 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:1063

Alcoholics Anonymous does not espouse any particular religious
doctrine. On the contrary, the Big Book goes to pains to explain that
63
any sect will do. It further explains that the references to “God” in
Alcoholics Anonymous programs are not meant to be limited to any
64
set doctrinal formulation of the Deity. Instead, the book instructs
65
readers to apply their “own conception of God.”
Despite this non-denominational bent, however, it is clear that
66
monotheistic spirituality is at the heart of Alcoholics Anonymous.
Notably, there is a chapter in the Big Book addressed to agnostics
67
and atheists that rebukes non-believers. It explains that agnostics
and atheists cannot overcome their addiction without a belief in a
68
higher power. According to this principle, such individuals only
69
benefit from the program if they cease to be atheistic or agnostic.
Though Alcoholics Anonymous does not consider addiction a moral
70
71
failing, it is clear that spirituality is required for recovery.
B. Current 12-Step Practices
The 12-Steps described in the Big Book continue to be central to
72
Alcoholics Anonymous and its progeny. As part of their recovery63. See id. at 45-46 (explaining the 12-Step belief, which holds that there is not
just one way that faith can be acquired, but that all humans can form their own
personal relationship with the Higher Power as long as they are honest and willing to
make the attempt).
64. Id. at 47.
65. Id.
66. See Kerr v. Farey, 95 F.3d 472 (7th Cir. 1996) (asserting that “a
straightforward reading of the twelve steps shows clearly that the steps are based on
the monotheistic idea of a single God or Supreme Being”); BUFE, supra note 56, at 64
(explaining that the 12-Steps were drawn directly from Oxford Group teachings,
compiled by Bill Wilson who believed he was working under divine guidance). The
author states that there is no mistaking the “overtly religious nature of the steps.” Id.
67. BIG BOOK, supra note 61, at 44.
68. See id. at 50 (stating that many of the original members of Alcoholics
Anonymous had been atheistic and had denied that they were alcoholics, but that
they eventually understood that they needed a spiritual basis for addiction recovery).
69. See id. at 44-45 (equating acceptance of religion with admitting an addiction,
and thus necessary for starting on the road to recovery).
70. See id. at 33 (presenting a medical theory for addiction that prevents an
individual from ever fully recovering); WHITE, supra note 10, at 151 (stating that 12Step members use terms such as “allergy, illness, sickness and disease” to describe
their addictions). But see id. at 330 (explaining that in the larger political
community, addiction often is characterized as a moral failing, rather than a medical
disease).
71. See BIG BOOK, supra note 61, at 44 (asserting the belief that a “mere code of
morals or a better philosophy of life” would be insufficient to overcome addiction;
rather, an acceptance of spirituality is required).
72. See BUFE, supra note 56, at 65 (describing the zealous endorsement of the 12Steps by members of Alcoholics Anonymous, Narcotics Anonymous, and other 12Step groups); see also BIG BOOK, supra note 61, at 59-60 (laying out the 12-Steps as
follows:
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support process, members work their way through each step with the
73
Religious concepts pervade the
encouragement of their peers.
traditions of many 12-Step programs, including prayers to open and
74
close meetings.
C. Judicial Consideration of the Religious Nature of 12-Step Programs
In determining whether the 12-Step program model can be
characterized as religious, courts rely on factors such as the spiritual
themes and practices, as well as the primary purpose of the
75
organization.
While this Comment agrees with the many

1. We admitted we were powerless over alcohol—that our lives had become
unmanageable.
2. Came to believe that a Power greater than ourselves could restore us to
sanity.
3. Made a decision to turn our will and our lives over to the care of God as we
understood Him.
4. Made a searching and fearless moral inventory of ourselves.
5. Admitted to God, to ourselves, and to another human being the exact
nature of our wrongs.
6. Were entirely ready to have God remove all these defects of character.
7. Humbly asked Him to remove our shortcomings.
8. Made a list of all persons we had harmed, and became willing to make
amends to them all.
9. Made direct amends to such people wherever possible, except when to do
so would injure them or others.
10. Continued to take personal inventory and when we were wrong promptly
admitted it.
11. Sought through prayer and meditation to improve our conscious contact
with God as we understood Him, praying only for knowledge of His will for us
and the power to carry that out.
12. Having had a spiritual awakening as the result of these steps, we tried to
carry this message to alcoholics, and to practice these principles in all our
affairs.
(emphasis in original)).
73. See Ethan G. Kalett, Twelve Steps, You’re Out (of Prison): An Evaluation of
“Anonymous Programs” as Alternative Sentences, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 129, 143 (1996)
(describing a typical meeting in which a speaker shares her or his story of addiction,
followed by open discussion of common experienced the participants share as
persons recovering from addiction); BUFE, supra note 56, at 66 (explaining that the
steps provide a structure and clear directions for the recovering addicts to follow).
74. See Calabro, supra note 13, at 598 (reporting that 12-Step meetings often
begin with a group recitation of the Serenity Prayer and end with the participants
joining hands and reciting the Lord’s Prayer). Both prayers are distinct to western
Christianity. Id.; see also BUFE, supra note 56, at 65-66 (claiming that many who
adhere to the 12-Step practices experience religious conversions in part because of
the emotional vulnerabilities caused by their attempts to stop abusing substances).
75. See Honeymar, Jr., supra note 15, at 444-45 (explaining that, though in many
instances the determination of what is “religious” is a complex academic
investigation, in the case of the 12-Step program, the quintessential religious ideas of
prayer and theism that are part of the 12-Step philosophy make the determination
much simpler).
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commentators that conclude that 12-Step programs are religious,
77
courts have had differing opinions.
78
In Stafford v. Harrison, for example, to support a finding that
Alcoholics Anonymous is not religious, the court relied on the fact
that the “Higher Power is expressly left to the definition of the
79
80
individual.” Likewise, in Youle v. Edgar, the court reasoned that, as
the primary function of the organization was to cope with addiction
81
and not to proselytize, it was not religious.

76. See, e.g., id. at 445 (characterizing the determination of religiousness of
Alcoholics Anonymous as an easy one because of program components such as
prayer and theism); Apanovitch, supra note 11, at 796-97 (explaining that by
examining the 12-Step program, rather than deferring to the group’s own statement
disclaiming any religious affiliation, one can find themes characteristic to most
theistic religions); Calabro, supra note 13, at 596 (citing three reasons to consider 12Step programs fundamentally religious: the history rooted in the religious Oxford
Group Movement, the references to “God” in the central texts of 12-Step programs,
and the incorporation of prayer into 12-Step events); Christopher K. Smith, Note,
State Compelled Spiritual Revelation: The First Amendment and Alcoholics Anonymous as a
Condition of Drunk Driving Probation, 1 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 299, 304 (1992)
(suggesting that Alcoholics Anonymous’ claim to be “spiritual” but not “religious” is
just a semantic distinction, not one that should withstand legal scrutiny). While
Alcoholics Anonymous chapters are fairly autonomous and may vary in religious
content, they consistently require compulsory admission of powerlessness and
submission to a higher being. Id. at 304 n.44. But see Byron K. Henry, Note, In “a
Higher Power” We Trust: Alcoholics Anonymous as a Condition of Probation and
Establishment of Religion, 3 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 443, 471 (1997) (arguing that
current constitutional definitions of religion are inadequate to determine whether
12-Step programs are included).
77. See infra notes 78-87 and accompanying text (finding that, while some courts
decline to find 12-Step programs religious because of the flexibility inherent in the
concept of a “higher Power,” others are unable to reconcile that finding with the
programs’ religious content).
78. 766 F. Supp. 1014 (D. Kan. 1991).
79. Id. at 1017. The prisoner claimed that mandated participation in Alcoholics
Anonymous as part of a prison treatment program violated the First Amendment
because it “improperly obligated him to abandon his own principles and adhere to
the principles of Alcoholics Anonymous.” Id. at 1016; see also Jones v. Smid, No. 4-89CV-20857, 1993 WL 719562, at *6 (S.D. Iowa Apr. 29, 1993) (relying on the fact that
the “God” or “Higher Power” of the program is as the prisoner understands, rather
than a static image, and that he could substitute other words for “God,” to find the
program not religious).
80. 526 N.E.2d 894 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
81. See id. at 899 (stating, without elaboration, that the primary function of the
program was to confront alcoholism). In this case, a driver whose privileges had
been revoked because of a drunk driving conviction sued the state for requiring him
to attend an alcoholism support group as a precondition to getting his license back.
Id. at 895-98. What is particularly striking about this case is that the court adopted
several 12-Step premises, namely that an alcohol abuser must admit to being an
alcoholic and receive life-long support.
Id. at 897.
While the petitioner
demonstrated over two years of sobriety without attending any support program, the
hearing officer found that he would always be at risk for a relapse and that merely
discontinuing the use of alcohol did not meet the definition of sobriety according to
Alcoholics Anonymous and others in the alcoholism field. Id. The court defined
sobriety not as abstinence, but as a “way of thinking” or a “manner of living.” Id.
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The majority of courts find that 12-Step programs are
82
83
In re Garcia is representative of the
constitutionally “religious.”
84
Rather than relying on the
conclusions of these courts.
organization’s assertion that the program is not religious, the court
examined the history of Alcoholics Anonymous and its contemporary
85
doctrine and practices. The court found that the required 12-Steps
86
were “premised on the idea of a monotheistic God” and that 12-Step
87
meetings are “permeated with religion.”
While the Youle court was correct that the primary 12-Step mission
is not religious, this should be only one factor in the Establishment
88
Clause analysis. Both the Youle and Stafford courts neglected to do a
thorough analysis of the program at issue, coming to an abrupt
conclusion based on Alcoholics Anonymous’ misleading self89
characterization of the 12-Step program. The Garcia court’s more
thorough examination revealed doctrine and practices that include
90
prayer and frequent reference to a monotheistic deity. That court
appropriately judged these factors to be determinative on the issue of
91
whether the programs were actually religious.
82. See Honeymar, Jr., supra note 15, at 445 (stating that most courts find
Alcoholics Anonymous “religious” because it relies on theism and prayer); Ira Lupu
& Robert W. Tuttle, Zelman’s Future: Vouchers, Sectarian Providers, and the Next Round of
Constitutional Battles, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 917, 985 (2003) (noting that courts
consider 12-Step programs religious, while discussing the recent shift away from strict
Separationism); see, e.g., DeStefano v. Emergency Hous. Group, 247 F.3d 397, 407
(2d Cir. 2001) (holding that an Alcoholics Anonymous program was a religion for
Establishment Clause purposes); Rauser v. Horn, No. CIV.A.98-1538, 1999 WL
33257806, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 2, 1999), rev’d on other grounds, 241 F.3d 330 (3d Cir.
2001) (adopting Kerr’s conclusion that 12-Step programs are religious); Kerr v.
Farrey, 95 F.3d 472, 479-80 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding Narcotics Anonymous to be
religious because of the repeated references to God in the texts).
83. 24 P.3d 1091 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
84. See, e.g., Griffin v. Coughlin, 673 N.E.2d 98, 102-03 (N.Y. 1996) (concluding
that, based on 12-Step doctrine and practices, Alcoholics Anonymous is religious);
Warner v. Orange County Dep’t of Prob., 115 F.3d 1068, 1076-77 (2d Cir. 1997)
(holding that the county could not condition probation on attendance at a 12-Step
program because of its religious content).
85. See Garcia, 24 P.3d at 1096 (discussing the religious background of Alcoholics
Anonymous as well as the current practices that require a belief in a “Higher Power”
and recitation of religious prayers).
86. Id.
87. Id. Alcoholics Anonymous participants in Garcia also recited the Lord’s
Prayer and received coins inscribed with the Serenity Prayer. Id.
88. See Honeymar, Jr., supra note 15, at 445 (emphasizing the presence of theism
and prayer in the assessment of religious programs).
89. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text (discussing Youle and Stafford as
examples of courts that look to the stated mission of programs rather than looking at
the actual practices of programs).
90. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text (citing courts that, in
determining whether a program is “religious,” look to the actual practices of the
program, rather than its stated mission).
91. See Smith, supra note 76, at 304 (noting that courts should investigate the

GALLAS.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC

1078

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

10/3/2004 5:57 PM

[Vol. 53:1063

III. RELIGIOUS EXPOSURE AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
A. Introduction to Establishment Clause Jurisprudence
The Establishment Clause captures the principle of separation of
church and state commanding that “Congress shall make no law
92
respecting an establishment of religion. . . .” Historically, the clause
was not understood to forbid governmental expressions of support
for religion, but rather to ensure that there was no compulsive state
93
taxation in support of established churches.
In modern times,
however, the Supreme Court has moved towards restricting
government expressions that communicate support for religious
94
ideas.
When challenging mandated 12-Step participation, a
conclusion that 12-Step programs are religious does not alone
compel a further conclusion that the Establishment Clause has been
violated. Rather, courts make that determination by applying one of
several tests that have emerged in Establishment Clause
95
jurisprudence.
The two tests currently used most often in
determining an unconstitutional establishment of religion are the
96
“Coercion Test” and the “Endorsement Test.”
actual activities of a group, rather than rely on the group’s stated purpose).
92. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Supreme Court in Everson v. Board of Education
clearly stated that the Establishment Clause is “made applicable to the states”
through the Fourteenth Amendment. 330 U.S. 1, 5 (1947); see also School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230-55 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (discussing
historical and logical support for the incorporation of the Establishment Clause into
the Fourteenth Amendment).
93. See Ira C. Lupu, Government Message and Government Money: Santa Fe, Mitchell
v. Helms, and the Arc of the Establishment Clause, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 771, 776-77
(2001) (noting that, in the primarily Protestant Christian early America, theistic
government pronouncements were common, but they did not draw the same
reaction as did coercive taxation used to support the Church).
94. See generally id. (tracing both the change in Establishment Clause
jurisprudence away from a strict monetary separation of church and state and
towards a restriction on government speech that could be viewed as promotion of
religion and the change in American religious history from a primarily Protestant
nation to a religiously pluralistic society).
95. See generally Apanovitch, supra note 11, at 797-804 (tracing the process of
Establishment Clause determination under several tests, including the “Coercion
Test” and the “Endorsement Test”).
96. See Jesse H. Choper, The Endorsement Test: Its Status and Desirability, 18 J.L. &
POL. 499, 504-08 (2002) (characterizing the Coercion Test and the Endorsement
Test as the two prime candidates to officially oust the Court’s three-prong test in
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)). The Lemon test, which was initially
articulated in a case about state financial assistance to religious schools, requires that
a statute have a secular legislative purpose, that its primary effect is neutral as to
religion, and that it does not foster “an excessive government entanglement with
religion.” 403 U.S. at 612-13. While the Lemon test reigned supreme for decades, in
recent years it has been discredited, if not overruled. See, e.g., Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr.
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(comparing the Lemon test to “some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that
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In deciding cases dealing with mandated 12-Step participation in
prison or probation contexts, courts have generally relied on the
97
Coercion Test. Using this test, the courts find Establishment Clause
violations if a prisoner or probationer is coerced to participate in the
98
program. However, because of the idiosyncrasies of the drug court
99
setting, such as the choice to enter the alternative docket, it is
difficult to conclude that a participant has been coerced into
100
religious observance.
The Endorsement Test is more appropriate
for the drug court context because it looks at the overall results of
government promotion of the program instead of relying on the
101
program’s details.
Rather than focusing on whether the state
compelled a particular individual to participate in a religious
exercise, this test questions the public statement made by such
102
government interaction with religion.
If the government action
appears to endorse the religious message, then it violates the
103
Establishment Clause.

repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad”); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793,
794 (2000) (recalling that, in Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997), the Court recast
the entanglement inquiry to represent just one criterion in the effect inquiry). The
Mitchell Court went on to decide the case on the basis of neutrality and secular
content, virtually ignoring the Lemon test altogether. Id. Although the Court has
never formally overruled the Lemon test, scholars assume it is essentially defunct. See,
e.g., Choper, supra note 96, at 499 (declaring that the Court has abandoned the
Lemon test in favor of the endorsement test). The two most prominent tests,
Coercion and Endorsement, are theoretically distinct, but the current state of flux of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence has lead to decisions that seem to combine the
two. See, e.g., Kerr v. Farey, 95 F.3d 472, 480 (7th Cir. 1996) (using the Coercion Test
for the ultimate finding, but including language that condemns a prison for favoring
religion over non-religion, an Endorsement Test matter).
97. See infra notes 127-42 and accompanying text (finding that, where prison or
probation officials use coercion to encourage 12-Step program attendance, courts
will declare the practice unconstitutional and in violation of the Establishment
Clause).
98. See infra notes 127-42 and accompanying text (discussing the court treatment
of 12-Step programs in correctional contexts).
99. See Terry, III, supra note 37, at 4-5 (describing some differences between
traditional courts and drug courts, focusing particularly on drug court procedures
that accelerate the intervention).
100. See infra notes 143-94 and accompanying text (arguing that the Coercion Test
is inappropriate in the drug court context).
101. See infra notes 192-220 and accompanying text (exploring the strengths of the
Endorsement Test, as applied to drug courts).
102. See Apanovitch, supra note 11, at 789 (suggesting that the Coercion Test
improperly ignores the principle of separation of church and state, which is a focus
of the Endorsement Test).
103. See infra notes 192-220 and accompanying text (providing background for the
adoption of the Endorsement Test and discussing several of its recent applications).
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B. Coerced Participation in Religious Practice
1.

Fundamentals of the Coercion Test
The first test, the Coercion Test, finds a violation of the
Establishment Clause if a state actor forces an individual to
104
participate in or observe religious practices. The central debate of
105
the test involves a determination of what constitutes coercion.
In
106
Lee v. Weisman the Supreme Court majority held that including
prayer in a public middle school graduation forced students to
107
participate in a religious activity.
Despite the objections of
fourteen-year-old Deborah Weisman and her father, the school
principal invited a rabbi to offer prayers at the opening of the
108
graduation ceremony for Weisman’s class.
The Court’s majority
noted the social importance of a school graduation ceremony, and
suggested that the choice to abstain from prayer was not a fair choice
109
for a graduating student.
According to the decision, this kind of
social pressure to support or participate in a religious act amounts to
110
“It is beyond dispute,” the Court
an act of government coercion.
concluded, that “at a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that the
government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in
111
religion or its exercise.”
Further, the Court found the school
112
graduation prayers to be state-compelled religious conformity.
The Court, however, acknowledged that the young age of the
students exposed to the school-sponsored prayer influenced the
113
decision, because of the students’ vulnerability to peer pressure.
104. See, e.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (holding that a voluntary
class in religion was constitutional, but if teachers coerced students to take the class,
then the Establishment Clause would be violated). But see Allegheny County v. Am.
Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 628 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(cautioning that “[t]his Court has never relied on coercion alone as the touchstone
of Establishment Clause analysis”).
105. See Calabro, supra note 13, at 580 (exploring two versions of the Coercion
Test that have emerged from the Supreme Court, a broad psychological Coercion
Test and a more demanding legal Coercion Test).
106. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
107. Id. at 587, 596.
108. Id. at 584. The students were expected to stand as a group during the
prayers, or at least keep respectfully silent. Id. at 593.
109. See id. at 594 (finding that the public prayers would exert terrific peer
pressure on the student to conform, especially in a school setting where the risk of
compulsion is especially high).
110. See id. at 586 (noting that, even though the school district did not require
attendance at the ceremony as a condition of graduation, the participation was “in a
fair and real sense obligatory”).
111. Id. at 587.
112. Id. at 599.
113. See id. at 593 (considering psychology research that found teenagers to be
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The Court did not indicate that the conclusion would necessarily
114
differ if the case involved adults rather than teenagers. However, it
made clear that youth—and the presumption of susceptibility to
psychological coercion that accompanies it—were factors in
115
determining whether the government acted coercively.
Writing the dissent in this case, Justice Scalia took a more straightforward approach to coercion, asserting that the majority’s
“psychological coercion” test was unworkable and “boundlessly
116
manipulable.” He noted that students at the graduation ceremony
had the choice to sit during the prayers rather than stand and
117
participate. He explained that the “coercion that was the hallmark
of historical establishments of religion was coercion of religious
orthodoxy and of financial support by force of law and threat of
118
penalty.”
Students who chose to abstain from the religious
119
By this definition,
observance of prayer faced no actual penalties.
then, the school did not coerce the students to take part in a religious
120
exercise.
A more recent case indicates that the dissenting view in Lee
currently represents the more prominent approach to the Coercion
121
Test. Specifically, the Court in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris reviewed a
school voucher program in which low-income parents could choose
to send their children to neighboring school districts, private
religious schools, private non-religious schools, or get tutoring for
122
children who remained enrolled in the local public school. Where
the voucher money was spent was highly dependent on where the
123
parents chose to enroll their children. The majority relied heavily
on the notion of private choice, and ruled that the school voucher
especially susceptible to pressure to conform to social conventions).
114. See id. (explaining that the application of the decision to adults was not
addressed by the Court).
115. Id.; see also Choper, supra note 96, at 504 (suggesting that the majority
definition of coercion, which includes indirect and subtle pressures, is broader than
the common understanding of the term).
116. Lee, 505 U.S. at 632 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
117. See id. at 637 (explaining that there was nothing physically compelling the
students to stand or participate, and no indication that student dissents were
dissuaded in any way).
118. Id. at 640.
119. Id. at 637. Justice Scalia further notes that a student’s mere respectful silence
during a prayer need not be considered assent nor participation. Id.
120. See id. at 642 (agreeing with the notion that the government cannot force
individuals to participate in religion, but finding that exposure to a school prayer did
not amount to coercion); see also id. at 609 (Souter, J., concurring) (considering the
disputed school practice to raise an issue of endorsement, rather than coercion).
121. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
122. Id. at 645-46.
123. Id. at 646.
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program was constitutional because parents maintained the choice to
124
A
determine whether to send their children to religious schools.
dissenting opinion, written by Justice Souter, however, suggests that
the parents’ decisions were based on limited educational options,
125
rather than religious preference and genuine choice. The majority
dismissed this hypothesis, and concluded that coercion did not exist
if the state did not force parents to send their children to a religious
126
school or only offered religious schools as a choice.
Thus, a
straightforward definition of coercion seems to currently reign on the
Court.
2.

12-Step programs and coercion
A number of lower courts have addressed the issue of mandated
participation in Alcoholics Anonymous or Narcotics Anonymous.
Generally, challenges to the constitutionality of the mandated
127
programs rest on Establishment Clause grounds, and nearly all of
128
the cases apply the Coercion Test. The Seventh Circuit opinion in
129
Kerr v. Farrey provides the clearest statement of the Coercion Test as
130
Prison
applied to mandated participation in a 12-Step program.
authorities required Kerr to attend Narcotics Anonymous meetings
131
during his period of incarceration. If Kerr refused, the authorities

124. Id. at 662-63.
125. See id. at 698 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that it was obvious that limited
educational options influenced parents rather than religious preference because
nearly two out of three families using vouchers to send their children to religious
schools did not agree with the religion taught there).
126. See id. at 640 (emphasizing that the choice offered to parents remedies any
coercion that could otherwise be present).
127. See infra notes 128-142 and accompanying text (discussing cases challenging
mandated participation in 12-Step programs). The one exception in the framing of
the challenges is Stafford v. Harrison, 766 F. Supp. 1014 (D. Kan. 1991), in which the
plaintiff challenged mandatory participation in the prison 12-Step program on Free
Exercise Clause grounds rather than Establishment Clause grounds. His specific
contention was that the program required him to abandon his personal religious
beliefs and to replace them with the principles of the 12-Step program. Id. at 1016.
Because the court ruled that the program was not religious, it did not consider the
intricacies of the Free Exercise argument. Id. at 1017.
128. See, e.g., Rauser v. Horn, No. CIV.A. 98-1538, 1999 WL 33257806, at **4-7
(W.D. Pa. Nov. 2, 1999) rev’d on other grounds, 241 F.3d 330 (3d Cir. 2001)
(considering the coercion involved with conditioning parole on 12-Step attendance);
Arnold v. Tenn. Bd. of Paroles, 956 S.W.2d 478, 484 (Tenn. 1997) (finding coercion
in a parole condition, but remanding to determine if the mandated program was
religious); United States v. Behler, 187 F.3d 772, 780 (8th Cir. 1999) (ruling that
coercion could not be considered until a specific treatment plan was developed for
the individual on probation).
129. 95 F.3d 472 (7th Cir. 1996).
130. See Apanovitch, supra note 11, at 828 (describing the court’s influential
analysis of the alleged coercive conditions).
131. Kerr, 95 F.3d at 474.
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would classify him as a higher security risk, a label that would have
132
In applying the
had negative consequences on parole eligibility.
Coercion Test, the Kerr court concluded that requiring attendance at
133
12-Step meetings constituted coercion.
Although the prisoner
technically had a choice of whether to attend, the consequence of a
negative decision would be a longer period of incarceration, and thus
134
it was not a meaningful choice.
In addition to declaring the prison practice unconstitutional, the
Seventh Circuit suggested a remedy. The opinion did not forbid
135
religious-based rehabilitation programs at the prison.
Instead, it
ruled that the prison needed only offer a non-religious program as an
136
This alternative would provide Kerr and other
alternative.
137
prisoners with a meaningful choice, thus defeating state coercion.
Following the Kerr decision, the District Court for Eastern
Wisconsin addressed the related question of whether criminal justice
authorities could avoid the coercion issue by having an alternative,
138
non-religious program made available at the petitioner’s request.
The court found that a parolee was coerced to enter a religiouslyoriented residential treatment facility as an alternative to returning to
139
prison for parole violations.
His parole officer contended that his
132. Id. Mr. Kerr brought suit claiming that he was required to participate in a
substance abuse program with overt religious content while in prison. Id. If he did
not participate, he would suffer adverse effects for parole eligibility. Id. The only
program offered was Narcotics Anonymous, to which the prisoner objected, because
he did not want to drag “God’s name into ‘this messy business of addictions’ and he
expressed his disagreement with the view of God that was proposed at the meeting.”
Id.
133. Id. at 479. The court concluded that the threat of adverse consequences for
refusing to attend amounted to coercive pressure to participate in a religious activity.
Id.
134. Id.
135. See id. at 470 (finding that the Establishment Clause was violated if the prison
only offered Narcotics Anonymous, or other religious based programs, without also
providing a secular alternative).
136. Id. (finding that case law supported the same conclusion that the
Establishment Clause does not allow the state to discriminate against atheistic or
agnostic inmates if they refuse to attend and participate in religious-based substance
abuse programs).
137. Id.; accord Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 640 (2002); see also Rauser
v. Horn, No. CIV.A. 98-1538, 1999 WL 33257806, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 2, 1999), rev’d
on other grounds, 241 F.3d 330 (3d Cir. 2001) (following the Kerr court and deciding
that participation in a religious-based rehabilitation program cannot be a parole
condition); Arnold v. Tenn. Bd. of Paroles, 956 S.W.2d 478, 484 (focusing on choices
offered to a prisoner in its consideration of whether the prisoner was coerced into
attending a specific treatment program); United States v. Behler, 187 F.3d 772, 780
(holding that Behler did not have a First Amendment claim based on his condition
for supervised release mandating that he undergo treatment as directed by his
probation officer because no treatment protocol had yet been established).
138. Bausch v. Sumiec, 139 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (E.D. Wis. 2001).
139. Id. at 1037. After the plaintiff was caught committing a parole violation, his
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attendance was not coerced, because she would have provided him
140
Regardless, the
with secular alternatives if he had so requested.
court found that the choice presented to the petitioner, namely
prison or a rehabilitation program with religious components, was
141
“inherently coercive.” According to the court, the state is required
to provide a meaningful choice of whether to enter a religious
142
program, rather than rely on an individual to request such a choice.
3.

Applying the Coercion Test to the drug court setting
a.

The consequences for drug court failure are not as coercive as the
consequences for probationers or prisoners

There is no case law on mandated 12-Step participation as part of a
drug court treatment protocol; however, the practice would likely
survive Establishment Clause scrutiny under the Coercion Test as it
has developed. Under the broader psychological Coercion Test of
143
Lee, the public order of a judge might be considered coercive.
144
However, the Supreme Court in Zelman and lower courts addressing
12-Step mandates have opted for the stricter version of the Coercion
Test in which the consequences of refusing to comply and the
145
individual choices offered must be examined.
At first glance, the
parole officer advised him that he could avoid returning to prison by entering a
specific residential substance abuse treatment program. Id. at 1029. The parole
officer did not suggest any alternative programs. Id.
140. Id. at 1035.
141. Id. at 1036. But see In re Garcia, 24 P.3d 1091, 1098 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001)
(arriving at a different conclusion based on similar facts). In a prison program
discussed in Garcia, an inmate was enrolled in either Narcotics Anonymous or
Alcoholics Anonymous sessions upon entering a chemical dependency treatment
program. Id. at 1091. The program did allow, however, for each individual to make
alternate arrangements. Id. at 1096. Though it appears that a prisoner would have
to act affirmatively to preserve his or her constitutional rights, the court found that
the existence of a non-religious program as an alternative meant that a prisoner was
not coerced, so there was no First Amendment violation. Id. at 1096-97.
142. See Bausch, 139 F. Supp. 2d at 1035 (providing the eloquent summary
statement that “it is the government’s obligation always to comply with the
Constitution, rather than to do so only upon request”); see also Apanovitch, supra
note 11, at 850 (suggesting that few would be brave enough to assert their rights
while under criminal justice supervision, and thus, most individuals would assume
they have no choice other than compliance).
143. Compare Philip Bean, Drug Courts, the Judge, and the Rehabilitative Ideal, in DRUG
COURTS IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE 235, 238-39 (James L. Nolan, Jr. ed., 2002)
(describing the legal and personal influence most drug court judges have over the
participants), with Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 581 (1992) (concluding that the
subtle pressure to conform that resulted from a public prayer was constitutionally
coercive).
144. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
145. See supra notes 121-142 and accompanying text (looking at both school
voucher systems and mandatory prison substance abuse programs, the courts have
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situation of a drug court judge assigning a 12-Step program to a
defendant does not seem to differ from a traditional judge
mandating 12-Step participation as a condition of probation. Yet, the
choice a defendant has of whether to enter the drug court, as well as
the kinds of consequences that exist for failure, make the drug court
146
context quite different. As such, challenges based on the Coercion
147
Test are likely to fail.
Unlike traditional court settings, defendants make the choice of
148
While the consequence
whether to enter the drug court docket.
awaiting a probationer or prisoner who refuses to attend a mandatory
149
12-Step program is immediate or lengthened imprisonment, an
arrestee refusing the opportunity to enter drug court will receive
150
nothing worse than the traditional court process.
The choice
offered to the defendant is between the traditional court procedure
and an alternative venue.
While undergoing criminal court proceedings may be unpleasant,
it can hardly be characterized as a coercive consequence on par with
definite incarceration. The traditional adversarial trial includes welltested procedural protections, as well as the chance that the judge or
151
jury will return a not-guilty verdict. Drug courts, on the other hand,

found it important that individuals are given options and that, beyond not having to
participate in religious-based programs, a refusal does not have negative
consequences).
146. See Terry, III, supra note 37, at 1-9 (comparing features of traditional courts
with drug courts, such as the procedure by which one enters each court docket; the
respective roles of attorneys, judges, and defendants; and the results of failing to
heed the stated requirements).
147. Compare Bausch v. Sumiec, 139 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (E.D. Wis. 2001) (finding
coercion based on the adverse consequence of imprisonment for refusing the
probation mandate), with NOLAN, JR., supra note 29, at 41 (explaining that the
consequences of drug court program failure is not immediate imprisonment but a
trial in the traditional court system).
148. See Sara Steen, West Coast Drug Courts: Getting Offenders Morally Involved in the
Criminal Justice Process, in DRUG COURTS IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE 51, 61 (James L.
Nolan, Jr. ed., 2002) (explaining that the option offered to arrestees of whether to
enter the drug court not only fulfills the practical purpose of assigning defendants to
dockets, but also serves the therapeutic goal of empowering substance abusers to
make the decision to actively pursue rehabilitation).
149. See, e.g., Bausch, 139 F. Supp. 2d at 1029 (reporting that the petitioner would
have gone to prison if he had refused to enter the religious program); Kerr v. Farrey,
95 F.3d 472, 474 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that the prisoner had a worse chance of
gaining parole as a result of refusing to attend the 12-Step meetings in prison).
150. See William D. McColl, Theory and Practice in the Baltimore City Drug Treatment
Court, in DRUG COURTS IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE 3, 8 (James L. Nolan, Jr. ed., 2002)
(describing the free choice an arrestee has between entering the drug court program
or continuing on the traditional criminal justice path).
151. See generally STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: CASES AND COMMENTARY 997-1307 (6th ed. 2000) (discussing the due
process rights afforded to each criminal defendant in the traditional court system).
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have the controversial feature of defense counsel participation in the
152
drug court “team.” Additionally, all participants in drug courts are
153
treated as if they were guilty. While the major benefit of the drug
court seems to be the chance to get a sentence other than
incarceration, this option actually exists in both dockets. Drug courts
154
do not change the existing sentencing structures. Rather, judges in
traditional courts can also avoid mandatory minimum sentences by
imposing deferred sentences or probation, and they can also
155
mandate addiction treatment.
Additionally, for drug court
participants, there is a distinct possibility that the mandated
treatment will take longer than any jail sentence they could receive
156
for their alleged crimes.
While entry into many drug courts
inevitably leads to mandated 12-Step participation, there does not
seem to be any coercion to enter the alternative docket, because
157
there is a meaningful choice between two dockets.
There is another point in the drug court process, however, that
opens the door to analysis under the Coercion Test. When the judge
provides the individual with the components of the treatment
program she or he must follow to remain in good standing with the
drug court, the individual is faced with a potentially coercive

152. See Richard C. Boldt, Rehabilitative Punishment and the Drug Treatment Court
Movement, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 1205, 1246 (1998) (examining the conflicting goals of
the traditional adversarial system and the therapeutic-oriented drug court system
along with the risks defendants encounter when defense attorneys abandon their
adversarial role and enter into a rehabilitative team); Morris B. Hoffman, The Denver
Drug Court and its Unintended Consequences, in DRUG COURTS IN THEORY AND IN
PRACTICE 67, 80 (James L. Nolan, Jr. ed., 2002) (exclaiming that “the bedrock
protections inherent in the adversary nature of our criminal justice system and the
independence of the judiciary are put seriously at risk” by the collaborative team
structure of drug courts).
153. See generally Bing-Newton, supra note 30, at 1881 (lamenting the assumption
of guilt that most people accused of drug crimes experience).
154. See Hoffman, supra note 152, at 79-80 (explaining that without separate
legislation, drug courts are still bound by the same sentencing rules that guide
traditional courts).
155. Id. This is not to suggest that drug courts are not innovative or that they fail
to do more to promote rehabilitation than traditional courts. Terry, III, supra note
37, at 7. Rather, this point is made to emphasize the fact that the consequence of
choosing traditional court is not comparable to the consequence of definite
incarceration in the probation or prison contexts. See supra notes 121-42 and
accompanying text.
156. See Goldkamp, supra note 18, at 22-23 (explaining that the minimum twelve
months of intensive treatment and significant judicial involvement is often seen as
more demanding than the few months in jail or on probation that an individual
would otherwise receive for their crime).
157. See, e.g., McColl, supra note 150, at 8 (explaining the detailed process judges
go through to allow participants to make an informed choice between traditional
court and drug court).
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158

decision.
Though the atmosphere in most drug courts seems far
159
less coercive than in a traditional court, it is important to remember
that judges still have the power of the criminal justice system behind
160
them.
Even at this point, however, the determination of coercion for
Establishment Clause purposes is less clear cut than in the probation
and prison cases. While the consequences of refusing a mandate to
go to 12-Step meetings in the probation and prison cases was actual
incarceration, the ultimate sanction in drug court is failing out and
161
returning to the traditional court system. Immediate incarceration
is only a threat for a drug court participant as an intermediate
sanction through which a judge may impose a brief jail stay to scare
162
the defendant into treatment compliance.
Though brief, it is an
actual deprivation of liberty and may be considered coercion when
viewed with a bright-line test that considers any consequence of
163
incarceration to constitute coercion. This creates an odd situation,
however, in which an intermediate sanction is considered to be more
164
coercive than the ultimate drug court sanction—getting kicked out.
The better test for determining an Establishment Clause violation in
the drug court context is Endorsement, because it focuses on the
overall implications of government interaction with religion, rather
165
than the details of specific choices and consequences.

158. See Steen, supra note 148, at 52 (explaining that treatment decisions are made
at various points during the drug court, which may have input from the defendant,
but are actually imposed by the judge).
159. See Bean, supra note 143, at 236-37 (describing drug court status hearings in
which the judge inquires casually about a defendant’s progress in the treatment
programs and appears to be on the defendant’s side); see also Steen, supra note 148,
at 60 (describing the incorporation of the defendant into the decision-making
process, in part to characterize the decision to abstain as a personal choice, rather
than one prompted by the court). But see id. at 59 (relating a prosecutor’s statement
that most real decisions are made outside of the courtroom, and away from the
defendant, so that the “team” can present a united front).
160. See NOLAN, JR., supra note 29, at 50-52 (arguing that it is a mistake to consider
drug courts to be “soft on crime” because the therapeutic approach is not necessarily
easier on defendants, even though it is more likely to achieve positive results).
161. See Hennessy, supra note 45, at 7 (listing as intermediate sanctions community
service, extra treatment requirements, additional time observing the drug court, and
being sent back to the regular court system as the ultimate sanction).
162. See Steen, supra note 148, at 62 (describing the judge’s decision to impose a
short jail stay as a “tough love” approach to convince the participant to focus on their
rehabilitation goals).
163. See supra notes 127-42 and accompanying text (describing cases that focused
on the consequences of failure to comply in the probation and prison contexts).
164. See Wolf, supra note 47, at 42 (showing the drug court team’s hesitation to
give up on a participant and fail him out of the drug court).
165. See infra notes 226-29 and accompanying text (describing how religious
endorsement is a violation of the Establishment Clause).
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Lesser protection for adults

As described above, age has been an influential factor in the
166
Supreme Court’s treatment of coercion. In Lee, the Court admitted
that the school setting and the students’ youthful susceptibility to
167
The Court even
coercion had some impact on its decision.
suggested that the result might be different if adults rather than
adolescents were being pressured to participate in religious
168
exercises.
An opinion by the federal district court in southern Iowa on a
program in the prison setting similarly explored the vulnerability of
the defendant, and implied there was a higher standard for adults
169
than minors. In Jones v. Smid, the prisoner objected to a treatment
170
program that was based on Alcoholics Anonymous principles. The
court denied that the program was “religious” by constitutional
171
standards, and thus denied him relief.
The fact that he was an
adult, however, clearly influenced the result. The court stated that as
an adult, he should understand that his participation in a religious
activity would not necessarily signify “his own participation in, or
172
approval of, a religious practice.”
The premise, evidenced by this
decision, is that prisons can pressure adults to participate in activities
that may be morally offensive to them, like prayer and religious
173
recitation.
Fortunately, other cases examining mandated 12-Step participation
174
did not follow suit.
These court opinions focused on the choices
made available to prisoners and probationers, rather than the
likelihood that a particular individual would feel compelled to
166. See supra notes 113-115 and accompanying text.
167. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593-94 (1992).
168. See id. (noting psychological research supporting the “common assumption”
that children are susceptible to strong peer pressure to conform). To illustrate how
adults are less susceptible to this type of pressure, the Court distinguished the school
setting from a prayer at the opening session of a state legislature, where adults are
free to enter and exit freely. Id. at 596-97.
169. Jones v. Smid, No. 4-89-CV-20857, 1993 WL 719562, at *4 (S.D. Iowa Apr. 29,
1993).
170. See id. at **1-2 (detailing the prisoner’s experience, in which he attended 12Step meetings as a condition of probation, but objected to a recitation of a promise
that included a recognition of God).
171. See id. at **4-5 (concluding that because Jones had the chance to substitute
different words for “God,” the program was not religious).
172. Id. at *5.
173. Id. (noting that the program and promise were not unconstitutional despite
the fact that they were offensive to Jones).
174. See, e.g., Kerr v. Farrey, 95 F.3d 472 (7th Cir. 1996) (failing to consider the
age of the prisoner in the context of coercion); Bausch v. Sumiec, 139 F. Supp. 2d
1029, 1033-34 (E.D. Wis. 2001) (focusing on the nature of the choice articulated to
the probationer, rather than any personal factors, to determine coercion).
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175

conform.
Similarly, it is unlikely that age or susceptibility to
compulsion would be factors considered by drug courts, because of
the legal trend away from the psychological definition of coercion
176
promoted in Lee.
c.

Waiver of objection

Arguably, persons electing to enter drug court programs waive
177
their rights to be free from pressure to engage in religious activities.
In electing to join the alternate docket, they have clearly indicated an
178
interest in avoiding the traditional consequences of criminal trial.
This choice, however, can hardly be equated with a conscious
decision to adopt religious views or even embark on a lifestyle
179
change.
Further, it is not reasonable to expect the arrested
individual to predict that the state would choose a religious-oriented
180
support group as part of the treatment mandated.
This position is supported by the analysis in a Second Circuit case,
181
Warner v. Orange County Dep’t of Prob., which dealt with Alcoholics
Anonymous attendance as a probation condition. The defendant
attended a few meetings before sentencing and did not object at
sentencing when the judge included a mandate to continue
182
attending Alcoholics Anonymous meetings.
When the defendant
later complained, the government argued that forcing him to go to
Alcoholics Anonymous did not violate the Establishment Clause, and
the dissent contended that he had waived any Establishment Clause
175. Id.; see also Calabro, supra note 13, at 579-81 (contrasting the psychological
Coercion Test put forth in Lee, 505 U.S. 577 (1992), which considered some
characteristics of the victims, with the more direct legal Coercion Test promoted by
the Court that dealt only with the objective factors of choices offered).
176. See supra notes 121-27 and accompanying text (discussing Zelman v. SimmonsHarris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002), where the Supreme Court upheld a school-voucher
program based on parent choice with an argument analogous to Scalia’s dissent in
Lee, which rejected the psychological Coercion Test); see also infra notes 252-55 and
accompanying text (exploring policy reasons for avoiding the imposition of a set of
offensive beliefs onto someone as a part of rehabilitation).
177. See, e.g., Warner v. Orange County Dep’t of Prob., 115 F.3d 1068, 1078 (2d
Cir. 1997) (Winter, J., dissenting) (arguing that a defendant who accepted a
sentence of mandatory 12-Step participation without complaining or appealing
waived his rights to later object to the religiousness of the program).
178. See Steen, supra note 148, at 51-52 (expounding on the importance of the
choice to enter drug courts, rather than choosing the traditional path of criminal
justice).
179. See id. at 63 (describing the initial choice to enter the drug court for many
people as “calculative involvement,” in which they make their decision based on a
desire to have their charges dismissed instead of a desire for treatment).
180. See generally id. (suggesting that most offenders have little understanding of
the drug court requirements when first exposed to the program).
181. 115 F.3d 1068 (2d Cir. 1997).
182. Id. at 1073.
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183

objection.
However, the majority found that a few meetings were
not enough for him to realize the full religious content of the
184
program. The court continued with a finding that the defendant’s
attendance before sentencing could not be relied on as an
unambiguous statement of assent to waive his rights, because his
185
knowledge and understanding of the program were incomplete.
Most drug court participants will likewise be uninformed when they
opt into the alternate docket. Different drug courts have various
strategies for informing prospective participants about what their
treatment regimen will entail. For example, in the Baltimore City
Drug Treatment Court the program starts with the public defender
and the prosecutor agreeing on a plan for the defendant, which is
later memorialized in a contract outlining the program and possible
186
sanctions for violations.
The defendant will enter the drug court
after signing the contract, where the judge will give the defendant
187
one last chance to reconsider.
Under these circumstances, the
defendant will understand what treatment protocol is required.
Ambiguity still exists, however, about whether the defendant
recognizes the religious nature of any mandated 12-Step
188
participation.
The process in other drug courts, however, can be even less
ambiguous. In two west coast drug courts, for example, prospective
participants actually go through a two-week introductory period that
189
includes tasks such as 12-Step attendance. The individual officially
190
opts into the drug court only after completing the two weeks.
In
this situation, it is difficult to suggest that the defendant did not know
what the treatment protocol required. Following the guidance of the
Warner court, however, it is arguable that even in this situation, the
defendant could not knowingly and voluntarily waive his or her
rights. In Warner, the court found that the evidence did not show
183. Id.
184. Id. The court mentions that the religiosity of the program intensified after
the defendant had attended for some time, because when he was found to be
unengaged and lacking zeal, his probation officer required him to attend more
meetings, despite his complaints about the religious content. Id. at 1073-74.
185. Id. at 1074. By his own admission, Warner only attended meetings before
sentencing to convince the judge he was already getting his problem under control.
Id. at 1074, 1078.
186. McColl, supra note 150, at 8.
187. Id.
188. Id. (describing the drug court components that will be explained to a
potential participant, such as treatment requirements and sanctions, but not
indicating that the specific programs will be described at any great length).
189. Steen, supra note 148, at 61.
190. Id.
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that Warner’s attendance at a few Alcoholics Anonymous sessions
prior to sentence gave him sufficient awareness of the nature or
extent of the religious exercises to justify either imputing consent or
191
charging him with forfeiture.
While the spiritual nature of the
program was apparent to Warner immediately, it was not until well
after beginning his sentence that Warner recognized the depth of the
192
program’s religious contents. Similarly, a two-week introduction to
the drug court program and 12-Step meetings would give a criminal
defendant a sense of the program, but it would not be enough to
193
convey the full extent of the religious requirement. More than just
a brief attendance is necessary to impute a knowing and voluntary
waiver, and thus the waiver doctrine does not repair the flaws of the
194
Coercion Test when applied in the drug court context.
C. Court “Endorsement” of Religious Programs
1.

Emergence of the Endorsement Test
The Endorsement Test is applied less frequently to questions of
195
mandated 12-Step participation than the Coercion Test, but it is the
better test with which to evaluate religious program components in
drug courts because it does not require an examination of the
penalty for failing out of drug court and the coercive power of that
196
consequence.
Rather the Endorsement Test condemns any
government action that promotes or endorses one religion over
197
another, or religion over non-religion.

191. 115 F.3d at 1073-74.
192. Id. at 1073.
193. See Steen, supra note 148, at 63-65 (describing the typical progression of
involvement with drug court programs as starting with an impersonal calculation
based on avoiding incarceration or clearing their records and moving to moral
involvement and engagement with treatment components).
194. See supra notes 180-84 and accompanying text (discussing Warner, 115 F.3d at
1073-74, where the court decided that attending Alcoholics Anonymous for a few
meetings is not long enough for a defendant to understand the full religious content
of the program and therefore could not knowingly waive the right to object to the
program).
195. See infra notes 220-24 and accompanying text (noting only one case where the
court applied the Endorsement Test to a question of mandated 12-Step participation
in the prison context).
196. See Apanovitch, supra note 11, at 837 (positing that the Coercion Test is
popular in the criminal context because it is an easier site-specific analysis for the
penal system, but suggesting that the Endorsement Test is more appropriate because
it emphasizes the constitutional issue of separation of church and state).
197. See generally Choper, supra note 96, at 508 (examining the Endorsement Test
and suggesting that it has gained favor among the Supreme Court justices, five of
whom have embraced it in various opinions).
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Justice O’Connor first articulated the test in her Lynch v. Donnelly
198
Justice O’Connor expressed concern with the
concurrence.
message of exclusion sent by the government when it supported a
199
particular religion.
The Lynch case involved a governmentsponsored winter holiday display that included a Christian nativity
200
Justice O’Connor examined both what the
scene in a local park.
city intended to communicate with the display, and the likely effect
on the viewers, concluding that the Establishment Clause would be
violated if either the government intended to endorse religion, or if
the government expression had the effect of conveying a message of
201
endorsement. Using this test, Justice O’Connor concluded that the
holiday setting—which included primarily traditionally secular
202
holiday symbols —suggested not endorsement of a religious
203
message, but a mere acknowledgement of the public holiday. Thus,
she agreed with the Court that the display was best understood as a
traditional celebration of a public holiday rather than a religious
204
endorsement.
Subsequently, the Court’s majority adopted the Endorsement Test
205
in Allegheny County v. ACLU, when the Court noted that in the
preceding years it had increased its scrutiny of the question of
“whether the challenged governmental practice either has the
206
purpose or effect of ‘endorsing’ religion.”
This case also involved
public displays of winter holiday symbols; however, there were two
different displays involved, which the Court chose to evaluate
207
separately.
The first display was an elaborate Christian nativity
198. 465 U.S. 668, 687-94 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). In this articulation,
Justice O’Connor proposed an endorsement inquiry as a clarification of the Lemon
Test. Id. at 688-89; see Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Since then,
however, it has evolved into an independent test. See Allegheny County v. Am. Civil
Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 594-95 (1989) (using the Endorsement Test without
any reliance on Lemon).
199. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687-88 (describing two situations that make a person’s
religion relevant to their political standing: government alignment with a specific
religion, even if informal; and outright endorsement or disapproval).
200. Id. at 671.
201. Id. at 690.
202. See id. at 671 (listing other elements of the display, including a Santa Clause
house, reindeer pulling a sleigh, candy-striped poles, and a banner reading “Seasons
Greetings”).
203. Id. at 692.
204. Id. at 691. See also Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301,
2323 (2004) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (clarifying her belief that instances of
“ceremonial deism” such as the national motto—In God We Trust—, religious
references in patriotic songs, and the words “Under God” in the Pledge of
Allegiance, do not amount to government endorsement of religion).
205. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
206. Id. at 592.
207. Id. at 581-82.

GALLAS.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC

2004]

10/3/2004 5:57 PM

ENDORSING RELIGION

1093
208

scene located by the “Grand Staircase” of the county courthouse.
The second display was a Chanukah menorah, along with a Christmas
tree and a sign saluting liberty, in the City-County municipal
209
building.
Applying Justice O’Connor’s Endorsement Test, the
Court found that the first display’s grandeur and location in a central
210
They did not
government building amounted to endorsement.
find, however, that the second display violated the Establishment
Clause, because the combination of religious and secular symbols
communicated recognition of the winter-holiday season, rather than
211
a preference for any religion, or for religion over non-religion.
In reaching these fact-specific conclusions, the Court examined the
212
Seeking to elucidate the
concept of government endorsement.
principle, the Court stated that the Establishment Clause “prohibits
government from appearing to take a position on questions of
religious belief” or from creating a situation in which a person’s
religious beliefs are relevant to their standing in the political
213
community.
Because the first display communicated support for
Christianity, it violated the Establishment Clause, while the second
display did not send a similar message of government preference
214
because of its particular characteristics.
The most recent Supreme Court expression of the Endorsement
215
Test is in Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe.
In this case, the Court
determined whether a student-led prayer delivered over the public
address system before public high school football games amounted to
216
endorsement.
The Court easily concluded that the speech in

208. Id. at 578.
209. Id. at 587.
210. Id. at 599-600.
211. Id. at 616.
212. Id. at 592-93 (listing prior cases where the Court either invalidated statutes
and programs because they constituted government endorsement of religion, or
where it explored the definition of the term); see, e.g., Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock,
489 U.S. 1 (1989); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Sch. Dist. of Grand
Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring); Epperson v. Arkansas,
393 U.S. 97 (1968); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1963); Abington Sch. Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (exploring the definition
of “endorsement”).
213. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 594.
214. Id. at 621.
215. 530 U.S. 290 (2000). This case also provides a good example of the way the
Coercion and Endorsement Tests can overlap because the case relies on Lee as its
primary precedent, but the majority of the Court’s inquiry focuses on whether the
expression in question communicated government endorsement of religion. Lupu,
supra note 93, at 808-10.
216. See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 294 (explaining that this tradition in a heavily Baptist
county was challenged by two families, one Catholic and the other Mormon).
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question was not the private expression of the student chaplain, but
217
had the appearance of school approval. The Court noted that the
policy through which the student prayer-leader was selected
218
encouraged religious messages.
Because most students at the
school would undoubtedly believe that the school supported the pregame prayer, the Court found that the practice violated the
219
Establishment Clause.
2.

Endorsing 12-Step programs in prison
One lower court has used the Endorsement Test to scrutinize the
religious nature of mandatory 12-Step programs in the prison
220
context, and found improper government endorsement. In Griffin
v. Coughlin, the Court of Appeals of New York emphasized that a
secular objective would not rescue a program that delivered a
221
religious message from Establishment Clause scrutiny. Defining the
test, the court explained, “[a]n endorsement violating the
Establishment Clause can be determined by examining whether the
message that the government’s practice communicates may be fairly
222
understood as favoring or promoting religion.”
Based on this
criterion, the court found that the prison practice of conditioning
expanded family visiting privileges on participation in Alcoholics
Anonymous upset the neutrality principle underlying the
223
Establishment Clause.
In choosing to promote the 12-Step
program, prison managers essentially choose to favor a religious
224
message.
3.

Applying the Endorsement Test to the drug court setting
Where drug courts mandate, or even encourage participation in a
religious activity, without simultaneously providing a secular
alternative, this constitutes endorsement. As the Supreme Court held
in Allegheny, the Establishment Clause prohibits the government from
217. See id. at 302 (noting that there was a specific school policy authorizing the
student-led prayer, and that the prayer was delivered on government property at
government-sponsored events).
218. Id. at 306.
219. Id. at 308.
220. Griffin v. Coughlin, 673 N.E.2d 98, 105 (N.Y. 1996).
221. See id. at 107-09 (explaining that the fact that the 12-Step program was
primarily for rehabilitation did not affect the investigation of its religious
components).
222. Id. at 108.
223. Id. at 106-07.
224. See id. at 108 (explaining that a “mandatory, exclusive program” with
religious components “favors inmates who adhere to those beliefs, and symbolically
condones the religious proselytizing those expressions literally reflect”).
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225

taking a position on religious issues.
When a judge recommends
participation in a religious activity as a way for an individual to
overcome an addiction, the judge is essentially telling the individual
that the values promoted in the activity are those by which he must
226
live in order to extricate himself from criminal justice scrutiny.
Within 12-Step programs, participants are instructed to adopt a
particular belief system, and court endorsement of the program
creates the unmistakable appearance of endorsement of that belief
227
system.
This kind of government expression sends a message to
nonbelievers that “they are outsiders, not full members of the
228
political community,” and thus violates the Establishment Clause.
The Endorsement Test does not prohibit the state from offering a
229
12-Step program as one rehabilitative option.
The test does,
however, prohibit the government from offering only a religious230
based program in the drug court context. As in Allegheny, where the
presence of several symbols negated the potential message of
government endorsement of religion, a presentation of a different
program option undermines any suggestion that the government
231
prefers religion over non-religion.
Therefore, if a drug court
provides non-religious alternatives to the 12-Step program, and does
not promote one over the other, it will withstand scrutiny under the
232
Endorsement Test.
225. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 594 (1989) (noting that the
Establishment Clause also prevents the government from making religious practice
relevant to an individual’s political standing).
226. See Steen, supra note 148, at 62 (emphasizing the role of the judge in both
fashioning the treatment protocol and enforcing it). A judge’s role in drug court is
not only to ensure that a client completes a program, but it is also to praise the client
for successful behavior in the program and to help the client understand the dangers
of lapsing from it. Id.
227. See Stanton Peele, Foreword to REBECCA FRANSWAY, 12-STEP HORROR STORIES:
TRUE TALES OF MISERY, BETRAYAL, AND ABUSE 5-10 (2000) (describing the pressure new
12-Step group members feel to adopt the values of the group, and referring to these
programs as group “coercion and brainwashing”), available at http://www.peele.net/
lib/twelve.html.
228. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
229. See Apanovitch, supra note 11, at 815-16 (noting that it may be constitutional
for states to offer religious programs in prisons as long as there are secular
alternatives available and the overall system is neutral). Apanovitch argues, however,
that the principle of government distance from religion would be better served if
only secular programs were offered. Id. at 839-41.
230. Id. at 815-16.
231. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 616-20 (1989) (finding that
the grouping of a Chanukah menorah with secular symbols on city property did not
convey government endorsement of religion).
232. Id.; see Smith, supra note 76, at 327-28 (describing a choice of programs as a
“constitutional cure” to an Establishment Clause violation); see also Calabro, supra
note 13, at 611 (arguing that while the state has a high interest in rehabilitating
substance abusers, its interest in doing so exclusively via Alcoholics Anonymous
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IV. 12-STEP DOMINANCE AND THE IMPORTANCE OF ALTERNATIVES
Despite the constitutional problems with 12-Step programs, they
233
remain incredibly popular as part of many addiction recovery plans.
One of the primary reasons for this reliance is the cost. The
programs are either virtually or totally free both to participants and
234
the courts, with any costs accrued borne by small donations from
235
members. Furthermore, the programs have a wide range, and exist
236
in nearly every corner of the United States.
In addition to their low cost and convenience, 12-Step programs
237
are widely regarded as successful.
Although there is little formal
238
research on the approach, it is clear that the programs have helped
239
thousands of people.
While studies indicate that results are
240
many people benefiting from the programs are true
mixed,
participation, without alternatives, is unacceptable).
233. See MILTON A. MAXWELL, PH.D., THE AA EXPERIENCE: A CLOSE-UP VIEW FOR
PROFESSIONALS 1 (Thomas H. Quinn & Michael Hennelly eds., 1984) (describing the
powerful influence of the 12-Step method in the addiction recovery field, and
suggesting that it is crucial for treatment professionals to understand the features of
the 12-Step “phenomenon”).
234. See Ethan G. Kalett, Twelve Steps, You’re Out (of Prison): An Evaluation of
“Anonymous Programs” as Alternative Sentences, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 129, 148-49 (1996)
(exploring the reasons behind the growing connection between 12-Step programs
and the criminal justice system). Because these programs are run by volunteers, they
relieve the criminal justice system of many financial and administrative expenses. Id.
at 148. Additionally, professionals widely accept 12-Step programs as an effective way
to fight addiction. Id. at 149.
235. See id. at 140 n.64 (explaining that “corporate poverty” was a deliberate
decision by the young Alcoholics Anonymous organization so that they would not be
distracted from their primary mission of helping persons addicted to alcohol).
236. See, e.g., Alcoholics Anonymous, A.A. Fact File, at http://www.alcoholicsanonymous.org/default/en_about_aa_sub.cfm?subpageid=12&pageid=24
(last visited Aug. 28, 2004) (on file with the American University Law Review)
(estimating that they have over 100,000 groups worldwide); Narcotics Anonymous,
Information About NA, at http://www.na.org/basic.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2004)
(on file with the American University Law Review) (reporting that, as of 2002, there
were approximately 20,000 known groups, holding over 31,000 weekly meetings).
237. See Alisdair MacKenzie & Richard P. Allen, Alcoholics’ Evaluation of Alcoholism
Treatment, 21-2 ALCOHOLISM TREATMENT Q. 1 (2003) (reporting that in a study of the
recommendations and criticisms of treatment clients, clients recommended
Alcoholics Anonymous as one of two preferred treatment components).
238. See WHITE, supra note 10, at 156 (explaining that the singleness of purpose
and tradition of anonymity complicate, if not outright preclude, the types of research
that behavioral health scientists would like to do on the 12-Step model). However,
Alcoholics Anonymous itself has published that of its dedicated members, fifty
percent became and remained sober, while twenty-five percent became sober after
some relapses. Id.
239. See Alcoholics Anonymous, Do You Think You’re Different, at http://www.
alcoholics-anonymous.org/default/en_about_aa.cfm?pageid=12 (last visited Mar. 30,
2004) (on file with the American University Law Review) (rebutting the lack of
objective data with numerous anecdotal stories of individual success).
240. See, e.g., Don McIntire, How Well Does A.A. Work? An Analysis of Published A.A.
Surveys (1968-1996) and Related Analyses/Comments 18-1 ALCOHOLISM TREATMENT Q. 1
(2000) (concluding that the effectiveness of 12-Step programs remains unproven);
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believers attributing their own recoveries to the 12-Step method and
241
assuming it is also the best approach for other substance abusers.
There are effective alternatives to 12-Step programs, however, even
for reluctant clients. A number of programs have been developed
specifically in response to perceived weaknesses and client objections
242
to Anonymous programs.
These alternative self-help support
243
groups include Secular Organizations for Sobriety (S.O.S.), Women
244
245
246
While
For Sobriety, SMART Recovery, and Rational Recovery.
there is little reliable data on the effectiveness of any of these

Chad Emrick, Overview:
Alcoholics Anonymous, in RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
ALCOHOLISM, VOLUME 7, TREATMENT RESEARCH 3, 4 (M. Galanter ed., 1989)
(reporting that while Alcoholics Anonymous membership often results in high rates
of abstinence, professionals are not able to reliably predict who will affiliate with the
organization and who will be helped by it).
241. See BUFE, supra note 56, at 65 (suggesting that most people who have used 12Step programs to support their abstinence, including recovered addicts-turnedcounselors, believe recovery is not possible without going through the 12-Steps).
242. See WHITE, supra note 10, at 156-57 (exploring some of the criticisms of the
12-Step method that have inspired others to create alternatives). For instance, many
feel that the religious concepts of Alcoholics Anonymous alienate and drive off nonbelievers, that Alcoholics Anonymous replaces one dependency/addiction with
another, and that reliance on the “Higher Power” prevents individuals from
developing their internal strengths and competencies. Id.
243. See Laura Flynn McCarthy, Beyond AA: Alternatives for Alcoholics Who Resist the
Program’s Religious Approach, HEALTH MAG., July/Aug. 1991, at 40, 43 (describing
S.O.S. as one of the original alternatives to 12-Step programs, with meetings in many
locations across the United States); see also BUFE, supra note 56, at 177 (explaining
that people displeased with 12-Step groups often attend S.O.S. meetings to vent
about the condescension and hostility they experienced in 12-Step groups, but
facilitators are skilled at steering discussions back to methods of staying sober).
244. See Mary Jeffrey Stevens, Alternatives to AA: Other Models for Dealing with
Addictions, at http://www.uic.edu/orgs/convening/AA.htm (last visited Mar. 30,
2004) (on file with the American University Law Review) (endorsing the Women For
Sobriety approach, with its Thirteen Statements of Acceptance that “help members
become more self-reliant in everyday life and achieve a lasting and successful
recovery”); BUFE, supra note 56, at 185 (describing this group as one that focuses on
empowerment of women addicts, based on the premise that women have different
emotional reasons for using substances, and require a different kind of recovery
support).
245. See SMART Recovery, at http://www.smartrecovery.org (last visited Mar. 30,
2004) (on file with the American University Law Review) (defining their purpose to
provide support for those who want to abstain, or are considering abstinence from
addictions, by changing individual behavior to achieve satisfaction and quality of
life); see also BUFE, supra note 56, at 178-79 (explaining that the SMART program is
based on cognitive behavioral self-help methods that allow participants to build
motivation, cope with urges, learn to manage desires and actions, and build a
balanced, happy life).
246. See Stevens, supra note 244 (providing an overview of the Rational Recovery
approach as one that emphasizes individual power and encourages group
participation to be limited to the short-term); BUFE, supra note 56, at 172 (reporting
that Rational Recovery is based on experiences of people who recovered without
help of any program and that it teaches individuals to recognize and overcome their
“addictive voice” that spurs them into addictive behaviors).
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approaches, anecdotal information and the rapid spread of some of
247
these programs suggest their potential.
The most significant hurdle for drug courts hoping to offer an
alternative to the 12-Step program is availability. While 12-Step
248
programs are nearly everywhere, the alternatives suggested above
249
Each organization does, however, offer
still have limited range.
support in starting new groups, and some offer internet meetings or
250
discussion groups.
Finding a way to offer one of these secular alternatives in drug
251
courts will eliminate any Establishment Clause issue.
More
importantly, however, from a policy perspective is the expectation
that having alternative approaches is likely to yield better
252
rehabilitation results. 12-Step programs work for many people, but
253
Unfortunately, addiction research has not
not for everyone.
revealed what type of program will work best for each person, but
there is evidence that those who are personally invested in their
254
recovery achieve better results.
Thus, programs that alienate
247. See id. at 168 (noting that, while in 1980 Women for Sobriety was the only
secular alternative to the 12-Step approach, there are a number of choices now, all of
which report numerous victories in the fight against substance abuse). These
alternative organizations function, like the 12-Step programs, as self-help support
groups and are offered free of charge or at little cost. Id.
248. See supra note 236 and accompanying text (discussing the prevalence of 12Step programs and reviewing the number of groups and meetings of popular
organizations).
249. See, e.g., SMART Recovery, supra note 245 (listing only 300 face-to-face meeting
groups worldwide); S.O.S., at http://www.cfiwest.org/sos/asp/result.asp?listtype=
ListAll (last visited Mar. 30, 2004) (on file with the American University Law Review)
(listing only 122 meetings across the country).
250. See, e.g., SMART Recovery, supra note 245 (listing at least one internet chat or
live voice online meeting each day of the week); Rational Recovery, at
http://www.rational.org/faq.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2004) (on file with the
American University Law Review) (offering online discussion groups with the caveat
that they are not intended to serve as a permanent support resource, as the Rational
Recovery program is intended to empower individuals to function without life-long
reliance on support groups).
251. See, e.g., O’Connor v. California, 855 F. Supp. 303 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (holding
that the state did not violate the Establishment Clause by promoting a program with
religious overtones when there were some, however few, secular alternatives).
252. See Lisa Rosenblum, Note, Mandating Effective Treatment for Drug Offenders, 53
HASTINGS L.J. 1217, 1226-28 (2002) (reporting on the perceived strengths and
weaknesses of several treatment modalities, including therapeutic communities,
pharmacological treatment, and inpatient treatment).
253. See Peele, supra note 227 (introducing stories of individuals that had
unsuccessful experiences with 12-Step programs because they were pressured to
accept pro-forma explanations of their troubles and were convinced that any
hesitation on their parts to admit their addictions or embrace the 12-Steps was
destructive denial).
254. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND
MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, TREATMENT IMPROVEMENT PROTOCOL
(TIP) SERIES 35: ENHANCING MOTIVATION FOR CHANGE IN SUBSTANCE ABUSE
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participants, or pressure an unwanted belief system on them are
255
unlikely to assist individuals in overcoming their addiction.
CONCLUSION
Drug Court evaluations suggest that the innovative combination of
criminal and addiction rehabilitation concepts is making a difference
in the criminal justice system, and that drug courts are meeting their
256
The problems associated with
goal of reducing recidivism.
mandated 12-step participation need not interfere with these positive
results.
Fortunately, solving the problems associated with
encouraging participation in religiously-oriented 12-Step programs is
easy: to defeat both the Coercion Test and the Endorsement Test,
drug courts need only offer a secular alternative when assigning a 12257
Step program as a treatment component. By offering a drug court
participant the choice between religious and secular support groups,
258
the state maintains its neutrality and provides the participants a
259
better chance of treatment success.
Although this solution is not complicated, courts have been slow to
recognize the issue, due in part to the prominence of 12-Step
recovery programs, as well as misunderstandings about their religious

TREATMENT 5 (1999) (reporting on longitudinal research that indicates that an
individual’s level of motivation is a “very strong predictor” of whether she or he will
succeed in changing addictive behaviors).
255. See BUFE, supra note 56, at 65 (noting, however, that many formerly
nonreligious members of Alcoholics Anonymous undergo a type of religious
conversion during the program because while healthy, well-adjusted people normally
do not change their views, it is not unusual for those in emotional crises to radically
alter their beliefs).
256. See STEVEN BELENKO, RESEARCH ON DRUG COURTS: A CRITICAL REVIEW, 2001
UPDATE 1 (Nat’l Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia U. ed.,
2001) (reporting, based on the considerable amount of research there is on each
drug court, that drug use and criminal activity are reduced while defendants are in
the program), available at http://www.drugpolicy.org/docUploads/2001drugcourts.
pdf. Further, the fewer studies that do exist on long-term impacts tend to show a
reduction in recidivism among persons who participated. Id. Other benefits
attributed to drug courts are cost savings and the collaboration they bring to how the
criminal justice system addresses drug offenders. NATIONAL DRUG COURT INSTITUTE,
DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF DRUG COURT SYSTEMS 7 (1999).
257. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 655-56 (2002) (revealing that
non-religious alternatives render the Coercion Test defeated); O’Connor v.
California, 855 F. Supp. 303, 308 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (concluding that the ability of the
probationer to pick among secular and religious programs meant the government
had not endorsed a religious one).
258. Id.
259. See Steen, supra note 148, at 64-65 (emphasizing the large role that moral
involvement with treatment can play in a substance abuser’s recovery). Study results
show that successful clients in their treatment programs seem to be morally involved
in drug court. Id. at 64.
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260

nature.
Because drug courts are a court-produced phenomenon,
the best solution will be one that similarly comes from the courts
261
However, because few have recognized the legal and
themselves.
policy questions related to mandating 12-Step participation, it would
be helpful for professional organizations involved in the drug court
field to address the issue in their training materials and
262
conferences.
While each drug court operates alone, they are not
isolated from the experience and advice of others, nor are they
263
While offering
operating without sources for technical support.
alternatives may be easy in large urban areas where non-12-Step
programs already exist, in smaller settings the transition could be
264
more challenging. Yet, together with the local treatment provider,
judges can craft individual solutions to ensure that each treatment
protocol will offer appropriate choices for the participant. The best
chance participants have for recovery is a creative judge following the
latest research, and working closely with treatment providers.
For most drug courts, this change will have little impact.
Participating in a 12-Step program is an important, but not
irreplaceable, component of the treatment provided to a
265
participant. Not only does offering a secular alternative answer the
Establishment Clause concerns, but it makes sense to provide drug
260. See BUFE, supra note 56, at 65 (noting that while in Alcoholics Anonymous,
religion is presented as the primary solution to addiction, this fact is seldom
mentioned in either the media or professional journals). When this fact is
highlighted in the media, it is often accompanied by the claim that Alcoholics
Anonymous’ program is not religious, but rather merely spiritual. Id.
261. See supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text (describing the judicial creation
of the drug court model). While a legislative directive to provide alternatives to 12Step programs could be effective, it would require a legislature to single out the 12Step model in order to ensure that any restrictions imposed would have the intended
effect. It is likely that this would not be a politically palatable move, because of the
wide-spread support that 12-Step programs receive, as well as public misconceptions
of addiction and recovery.
262. See National Association of Drug Court Professionals, at http://www.nadcp.org/
about/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2004) (on file with the American University Law Review)
(describing their mission as support and technical assistance for drug courts, and
listing training conferences and other resources); Office of Justice Programs Drug Court
Clearinghouse and Technical Assistance Project, at http://spa.american.edu/justice/
drugcourts.asp (last visited July 30, 2004) (on file with the American University Law
Review) (listing facilitation of discussion on issues of concern, individual
consultations, and responses to information requests among the services offered).
263. See, e.g., National Drug Court Institute, at http://www.ndci.org/aboutndci.htm
(last visited Mar. 30, 2004) (on file with the American University Law Review)
(providing numerous training and technical assistance opportunities for new and
established drug courts).
264. See, e.g., SMART Recovery, supra note 245 (listing current programs primarily
in large urban areas); Rational Recovery, supra note 250.
265. See supra notes 241-47 and accompanying text (describing alternatives to 12Step programs).
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court participants with the chance to become involved in a support
group with which they are comfortable. This will increase their
chances of successful treatment, which in turn will increase the
likelihood that they will not go back through the revolving door of
266
drug use, crime, and punishment.

266. See NOLAN, JR., supra note 29, at 39 (describing the drug court movement as a
“revolution” in criminal justice because of the innovative collaboration between the
fields of addiction treatment and criminal justice).

